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Introduction
The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s 
Nuclear Security Initiative (NSI) began as an 
exploratory grant in 2007, and was extended into 
a seven-year, $24.7 million initiative when the 
foundation’s leadership saw a window of oppor-
tunity and the potential to make a significant 
impact within a relatively short time. The initia-
tive was sunset in 2015. 
The Hewlett Foundation currently organizes 
its grantmaking within five core program areas 
(William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, n.d.). 
Like many foundations, Hewlett pursues oppor-
tunities for impact beyond its primary program 
areas, reserving funds each year to support 
what it calls “special projects.” These projects 
— including one-time grants or multiyear ini-
tiatives — are not required to align neatly with 
existing program goals, but must adhere to 
the framework (now called Outcome-Focused 
Philanthropy) that guides all of Hewlett’s strate-
gic work. 
Once funded, special projects are often renewed 
or extended over several years, so it can be easy 
to lose sight of an impending end point. Such 
was the case with the NSI: partnerships had 
developed, momentum built, and expectations 
arose as the initiative was extended over seven 
years. Uncertainty among Hewlett staff, grant-
ees, and co-funders about when the initiative 
would end led to disappointment within and out-
side the foundation when the NSI exit strategy 
began to take shape. 
Key Points
 • As its seven-year Nuclear Security Initiative 
wound down in late 2014, the William and 
Flora Hewlett Foundation engaged ORS 
Impact to conduct a summative evaluation. 
That evaluation yielded insights pertinent to 
future work on nuclear security and other 
fields where policy-related investments, 
strategies, and goals are prioritized, as well 
as insights regarding Hewlett’s approach to 
the initiative exit.
 • During the life of the initiative, significant 
changes in the geopolitical landscape 
influenced both the relevance and the 
expected pace of advancement of its 
established goals and targets. Rather than 
focusing on whether identified targets had 
been achieved in a narrow “success/failure” 
framework, the evaluation explored where 
and how Hewlett’s investments and actions 
made a difference and where meaningful 
progress occurred over the seven years of 
investment. Evaluation findings highlighted 
contributions and areas of progress that had 
not been explicitly anticipated or specifically 
identified in the initiative’s theory of change. 
 • This article describes the initiative and 
its theory of change, evaluation methods 
and approaches, findings, and how these 
informed the foundation’s planning for 
initiative exits and approach to measure-
ment of time-bound investments. Although 
time-bound philanthropic initiatives are a 
well-established practice, the approach 
merits closer examination in order to discern 
effective ways to implement, evaluate, and 
wind down these types of investments.
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1347
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As the NSI drew to a close in late 2014, Hewlett 
engaged ORS Impact to conduct a summative 
evaluation. Although the NSI included specific 
goals and targets, the foundation team and eval-
uators determined that summative evaluation 
would not focus narrowly on assessing whether 
or not these had been achieved. Instead, eval-
uation sought to document how and where 
Hewlett’s investments made a substantive dif-
ference during the seven-year NSI, where mean-
ingful progress occurred, and how Hewlett’s exit 
was perceived by the field. The timing of ORS 
Impact’s evaluation offered a rich opportunity for 
the foundation’s leadership and program staff to 
deepen understanding about both philanthropic 
approaches and monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) in the context of a time-bound initiative. 
Although time-bound philanthropic initiatives 
are a well-established practice, the approach 
merits closer examination in order to discern 
effective ways to implement, evaluate, and 
wind down these types of investments. This 
article describes the NSI evaluation along with 
how findings informed Hewlett’s philanthropic 
approach, and provides a case example of a phil-
anthropic-initiative exit. Key considerations for 
M&E practices that are particular to the context 
of philanthropic investments where an exit is 
planned are also presented. 
Overview of the Nuclear 
Security Initiative 
Security issues are not a central element in the 
Hewlett Foundation’s main programs, though 
it has a history of funding special projects in the 
peace and security space in response to perceived 
opportunities. At the time the NSI was launched 
in early 2008, the foundation assessed that near-
term gains on pressing policy issues were possi-
ble, presenting a ripe opportunity for impact. 
The initial NSI investments occurred at a 
time when many philanthropies were shifting 
from more traditional grantmaking to bolder 
approaches — sometimes called “big bets” — 
that were often designed to address complex, 
systemic issues and achieve meaningful social or 
environmental change. A common belief in the 
philanthropic sector was that with a high degree 
of accountability to impact, foundations could 
surgically and successfully realize ambitious 
goals within a reasonable time period (Brest, 
2011). At the NSI’s inception, Hewlett’s philoso-
phy of grantmaking was guided by this point of 
view, an approach known as “strategic philan-
thropy” (Brest & Harvey, 2008). 
The NSI had a bold, aspirational goal to reduce 
the risk of a nuclear disaster by a discernable 
margin. The initiative encompassed three main 
strategy areas, each one large and complex in its 
The initial Nuclear Security 
Initiative investments 
occurred at a time when 
many philanthropies were 
shifting from more traditional 
grantmaking to bolder 
approaches — sometimes 
called “big bets” — that were 
often designed to address 
complex, systemic issues 
and achieve meaningful 
social or environmental 
change. A common belief 
in the philanthropic sector 
was that with a high degree 
of accountability to impact, 
foundations could surgically 
and successfully realize 
ambitious goals within a 
reasonable time period.
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own right and each with numerous ambitious 
policy targets.1 (See Figure 1.)
During seven years of investment the NSI set 
over 100 specific targets that spanned numerous 
issues, including strategic developments within 
NATO, multinational as well as nation-specific 
actions, and the fair consideration and adoption 
of treaties and agreements.2 The number and the 
array of targets reflected the foundation’s view 
that a time-bound investment could be success-
fully and precisely calibrated. 
The NSI grants were made to a range of orga-
nizations, including university-based research 
institutes and think tanks, as well as nonprofits 
engaged in advocacy and communications activ-
ities. Grants included both restricted support for 
specific programs and general operating sup-
port. Significant investments were made in five 
1A target is a type of outcome that describes a specific change or specific amount of change (e.g., 90 percent of all third-
grade students are reading at grade level). Targets communicate expectations about impact and are often used in strategic 
philanthropy or venture philanthropy. In the context of the NSI, targets reflected expectations about change and could be 
assessed as having been “achieved” or “not achieved.” 
2Although some of the NSI’s targets may reflect the passage of legislation (based on inputs from grantees and experts in the 
field), the Hewlett Foundation does not lobby or earmark its funds for prohibited lobbying activities, as defined in the federal 
tax laws. Its funding for policy work is limited to permissible forms of support only, such as general operating support grants 
that grantees can allocate at their discretion and project support grants for nonlobbying activities (e.g., public education and 
nonpartisan research).
 
Strategic Stability Among the P5 and Their Allies
Better International Rules
Sample of Grantees
Sample of Grantees
The nuclear powers (P5) and their 
allies develop or maintain stable 
bilateral and multilateral strategic 
relations, and reduce their reliance 
on nuclear weapons in their defense 
policies.
The international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime becomes 
more effective, enforceable, and 
equitable. Non-nuclear emerging 
states commit to equitable and 
enforceable nonproliferation policies.
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proliferation.
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American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Nuclear Threat Initiative
Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies
Institute for Science and International Security
Natural Resources Defense Council
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
FIGURE 1  Overview of NSI Strategy Areas 
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“anchor” grantees — organizations that the foun-
dation viewed as key partners in the pursuit of 
initiative goals. 
Beyond these financial investments, Hewlett 
invested human resources to boost the efforts of 
grantees and enhance impact. The NSI program 
officers took steps to convene grantees and sup-
port coordinated strategy, and were also careful 
to situate the initiative’s efforts with the ongo-
ing work in the field, coordinating closely with 
their counterparts in the Peace and Security 
Funders Group. As time went on, program offi-
cers gained a sense of the nuclear security field’s 
strengths and weaknesses and shared insights 
with both peer funders and grantees in order to 
inform strategy. 
A combination of shifts in the foundation’s stra-
tegic priorities and an assessment of diminished 
opportunity in the nuclear policy arena led the 
foundation to wind down the NSI in 2013. An 
important aspect of the wind-down strategy 
was intentional efforts to strengthen capabili-
ties within the nuclear field via joint efforts with 
other funders and a number of organizational 
capacity-building grants. 
NSI Evaluation Approach and Methods
The field of nuclear security is beset by a host 
of wicked problems. Thousands of destructive 
weapons — in the hands of regimes that are 
stable and in those that are less so — inevitably 
shape power relationships within a complex, 
global political system. Nuclear materials are 
transported and stored without proper pro-
tections and there is the risk that weapons or 
nuclear materials can wind up in the hands of 
nefarious actors. For these sorts of problems, 
the pathway to desired goals cannot always be 
plotted in advance. Despite established goals and 
targets, the actual results for any initiative tack-
ling such a web of wicked problems are unlikely 
to conform to plan. To maintain relevance, tar-
gets — and sometimes goals — must evolve in 
response to an interplay of global factors. It is 
against this complex backdrop that the NSI sum-
mative evaluation took place. 
Evaluation can be conducted for a number of 
purposes. The NSI evaluation did not focus on 
accountability; nor did it aim to assess the merit 
and worth of the NSI’s impact by examining its 
100-plus targets within a narrow “success/fail-
ure” framework or by asking whether the ini-
tiative had advanced its bold goal to reduce the 
risk of a nuclear disaster. Instead, ORS Impact’s 
evaluation was intended to support the founda-
tion’s learning and ongoing strategy decisions.3 
As such, the evaluation was a broad and inclusive 
inquiry that aimed to systematically assess and 
determine how and where the NSI had made 
a substantive difference — where meaningful 
progress had occurred, and perceptions within 
the field about the foundation, the initiative, and 
the exit process. 
To support learning and decision-making, evalu-
ation inquiry broadened the notion of what could 
be considered “success” in a global-scale poli-
cy-change effort and assessed where progress had 
occurred in forms other than achieving specific 
policy targets — certainly the most visible but 
also the most ambitious sorts of change. 
3The NSI evaluation’s purpose and methods are consistent with strategic learning. For further description of this evaluative 
approach, see Patton, 2011; Coffman & Beer, 2011; and Lynn, 2012. 
[T]he evaluation was a broad 
and inclusive inquiry that 
aimed to systematically assess 
and determine how and where 
the NSI had made a substantive 
difference — where meaningful 
progress had occurred, and 
perceptions within the field 
about the foundation, the 
initiative, and the exit process.
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The NSI summative evaluation relied on four 
sources of data: 
1. in-depth interviews with a broad cross 
section of actors in the field, including 
Hewlett staff, grantees, funders, policy-
makers, and experts inside and outside of 
government (n = 35); 
2. analysis of 720 grantee and program officer 
reports; 
3. review of selected news articles, op-eds, 
websites, and grantee and funder publica-
tions; and
4. a focus group with four evaluation experts, 
including those with experience in philan-
thropy, where the intent was to discuss 
monitoring and evaluation approaches rele-
vant to initiatives such as the NSI. 
Using purposive sampling, key informants were 
carefully selected with the help of an advisor 
who consulted with the evaluation team. The 
evaluation advisor, Joy Drucker, brought deep 
expertise in peace and security issues and was 
able to identify and help broker connections to 
those who could provide rich perspectives on the 
questions of interest, including those inside and 
outside of government.  
Key informant interviews and reporting doc-
uments underwent thorough content analysis. 
Interviews and reports were coded to surface 
particular patterns and themes where data 
offered a weight of evidence. To provide perspec-
tive on how and where meaningful differences 
had been realized over the life of the initiative, 
the evaluation drew on the metaphor of an ice-
berg. (See Figure 2.) The evaluation sought to 
describe the wide base of the iceberg “below the 
waterline” — the array of less visible changes 
 
Iceberg: A Metaphor for Policy Change
Improved 
communications
M O R E  
TA N G I B L E
L E S S  
TA N G I B L E
Achievement of domestic & international policy targets
Better and more 
relevant research
Strengthened 
relationships
Increased coordination 
among NGOs 
E X A M P L E S :
E X A M P L E S :
FIGURE 2  Iceberg: A Metaphor for Policy Change. Adapted from Schlangen and Coe, 2014.
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that constitute modest but important incremen-
tal progress or establish the enabling conditions 
for more visible policy changes, such as more 
effective dialogue, stronger alliances among key 
actors, and improved capacity for effective com-
munications. In the case of the NSI, the “below 
the waterline” outcomes were highly relevant to 
the initiative’s strategies — including both grants 
and nongrantmaking approaches (Schlangen & 
Coe, 2014).
The methods employed in this evaluation were 
intended to generate useful findings that could 
inform action. Findings are not intended to be 
generalizable, though they may be reasonably 
applied to other, similar settings — e.g., poli-
cy-change initiatives implemented in an environ-
ment of complexity that are also time bound.4
The foundation understood that insights from 
the summative evaluation would not be applied 
directly to its efforts within the NSI; rather, the 
desire was for an inclusive, comprehensive set of 
lessons that could be applied to other foundation 
initiatives. The foundation was also interested in 
delivering insights to those that would remain in 
the nuclear security field — including its grant-
ees and the Peace and Security Funders Group 
(PSFG). 
Insights relevant to the foundation and the field 
that are described in this article include the 
following:  
• Be thoughtful about the desired impacts of 
a time-limited initiative based on the con-
text, the scale of investment, and the range 
of strategies. 
• Regularly reassess the ongoing relevance 
of desired impacts and/or targets given 
changes within foundations or the sur-
rounding environment. 
• Apply broad measurement frames that 
allow a full, rich picture of progress to 
emerge — beyond quantifiable targets. 
Evaluation Findings: Notable 
Accomplishments
The weight of evaluation evidence pointed to 
key accomplishments that were attributable to 
Hewlett’s grantmaking and its role as a philan-
thropic partner. As a partner, the foundation 
spurred interchange and collaboration within 
the field by convening key players, identified and 
addressed the field’s biggest capacity gaps, con-
tributed to significant policy agreements, and 
facilitated tighter alignment among grantees 
and funders. 
The ‘Three-Legged Stool”
The NSI addressed shortcomings and enhanced 
capacity within the nuclear security field by 
emphasizing that the field’s diverse organizations 
— including technical, research-focused orga-
nizations and politically savvy advocates — are 
necessary complements for one another. The NSI 
program officers recognized the need for grant-
ees to adopt a sustained campaign mentality to 
marshal their strongest arguments and allies 
against the wicked problems inherent in the field. 
The NSI helped grantees and funders see that the 
field must function as a “three-legged stool” in 
order to be most successful. The concept refers to 
intentional integration of elements that together 
provide a solid base for advancing policy change: 
the “legs” being strong, relevant research and 
analysis; effective advocacy and communica-
tions; and seamless coordination among mul-
tiple actors, some of whom might specialize in 
either research or advocacy. The NSI supported 
an expansive group of grantees, including those 
that were described as “new voices, new players.” 
Noting that grant support in the field had previ-
ously been tilted towards research, interviewees 
credited Hewlett with proactively and intention-
ally leading the effort to build advocacy capac-
ity within the field. The cohesive “three-legged 
stool” framework reflected a new way of operat-
ing for the field. 
While emergence of a strong campaign mental-
ity was not one of the targets specifically artic-
ulated within the NSI, evidence indicates that 
4For more discussion of the generalizability of qualitative evaluation data, see Patton, 1980. 
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grantee efforts bore impressive fruit by helping 
create an enabling environment for adoption of 
the New START strategic arms reduction treaty 
in 2010. As one interviewee noted, “[to advance 
policy solutions], you want to have a set of grants 
that goes at the drivers of [nuclear security] pol-
icy.” In the case of the New START, well-coor-
dinated actors with a greater range of expertise 
were well positioned for success. There is also 
evidence that the NSI’s ongoing, balanced invest-
ment in research and analysis, advocacy, and field 
building helped ensure that actors were prepared 
for future efforts.
Improved Nuclear Governance
One of the NSI’s strategy areas was to create or 
strengthen international rules and governance 
structures to address weapons proliferation, 
prudent development of nuclear power, and safe 
handling of nuclear materials. Consistent with 
Hewlett’s approach, there were numerous pol-
icy targets associated with this strategy area, 
and the evaluation found evidence of progress 
on a number of them. Grantees also succeeded 
in highlighting urgent nuclear security issues 
confronting NATO. And, the NSI was credited 
with boosting the capacity of nongovernmen-
tal nuclear policy specialists in key countries to 
engage more effectively in the arena. 
A notable international policy success arose via 
one of Hewlett’s anchor grantees — namely, 
the creation and adoption of the nuclear ven-
dors’ code of conduct, which enlisted commer-
cial vendors of nuclear energy technology in a 
new nuclear security regime and thus achieved 
an important paradigm shift. One NSI grantee 
observed that vendors had previously viewed 
those in favor of nonproliferation as radi-
cal: “You couldn’t be pro-nuclear energy and 
pro-nonproliferation. [With the code], that has 
now evolved.” Although the complexity of the 
policy-change process can make it difficult to 
confirm a clear causal relationship between phil-
anthropic investment and policy outcomes, this 
was a rare instance where it was possible. As one 
expert put it, “This was the Hewlett Foundation 
punching above their weight.” 
Adoption of the code of conduct was one of the 
initiative’s targets, and highlights the notion of 
quality over quantity. There were numerous 
policy targets associated with this NSI strategy, 
and some may ask whether achievement of a 
single target qualifies as a notable accomplish-
ment. However, it is important to recognize the 
code of conduct was a significant, multinational, 
cross-sector agreement that resulted from strenu-
ous negotiations. 
Perception of Hewlett as Leader
The Hewlett Foundation’s re-entry into the 
nuclear security space was seen as bringing 
“excitement, energy, and innovation”; many key 
informants perceived the Hewlett brand as syn-
onymous with innovation. Throughout the NSI, 
the foundation showed a willingness to embrace 
new, potentially high-value investment areas that 
had not received significant attention from other 
funders in the nuclear security space. An exam-
ple was investments the NSI made in Turkey and 
Brazil, which were emerging both technologi-
cally and politically and thus bound to influence 
the trajectory of nuclear security. Hewlett was 
credited with being a leader and the main funder 
for this work, and those knowledgeable about the 
effort described the impacts as “huge.” 
Although the complexity of 
the policy-change process can 
make it difficult to confirm 
a clear causal relationship 
between philanthropic 
investment and policy 
outcomes, this was a rare 
instance where it was possible. 
As one expert put it, “This 
was the Hewlett Foundation 
punching above their weight.” 
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Early in the NSI, there was concern that certain 
states entering the global nuclear security debate 
lacked a cadre of thought leaders with sufficient 
expertise, relationships, and funding to wield 
meaningful influence. Hewlett’s investments in 
building the capacity of both government and 
civil-society actors to develop localized solutions 
to nuclear challenges, enhance oversight, and 
shape the debate at the domestic and interna-
tional levels were viewed as critical to improving 
nuclear security globally. Those familiar with the 
NSI’s work in Turkey and Brazil saw significant 
gains in both states in terms of knowledge, trans-
parency, and relationships between governmen-
tal and civil-society actors. 
Hewlett also made a concerted effort to encour-
age innovation in the field. During the final years 
of the NSI, the foundation forged a partnership 
with four other nuclear security funders — the 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John 
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 
the Ploughshares Fund, and the Skoll Global 
Threats Fund — to form the Nuclear Innovation 
Collaborative. A charge of this group is to bring 
“positive disruption” to the arena of nuclear 
security in order to identify new ideas and 
approaches. The ultimate aim is to update the 
archaic Cold War framework within which 
nuclear security is often discussed and address 
the waning prominence of nuclear weapons 
issues in recent political debate (Ploughshares 
Fund, 2014). Although the collaborative is still 
young, one of its major areas of focus will be 
bringing together innovators from different 
backgrounds to pursue high-impact collabora-
tions and draw more active and effective people 
into the field. 
Like the campaign mentality that emerged, 
broadened innovation in the field was not articu-
lated as an NSI target — although evidence indi-
cates that the foundation’s work in this area led 
to impressive results. 
Insights Regarding Strategy, 
Evaluation, and Exit Planning 
Contemporary approaches to grantmaking 
employ a wide variety of philanthropic tools for 
addressing a problem or opportunity of interest to 
a foundation. Traditionally, grantmaking focused 
on establishing core programs and continuing to 
support them over a long time frame. The desire 
for high-impact approaches grew with the trends 
of venture philanthropy, strategic philanthropy, 
and grantmaking effectiveness. The concept of a 
targeted, time-bound initiative is an outgrowth of 
these newer philosophies; emphasis is on invest-
ment in specific strategies aimed at achieving 
clear goals in a limited time period. Given that 
the success of policy-focused efforts can be contin-
gent on mercurial realities, it can be self-defeat-
ing to tie an initiative’s success to overly specific 
or ambitious goals. This raises the questions of 
how a time-bound initiative can be both targeted 
and responsive, and which approaches are best 
to gauge progress. Discussion below illuminates 
insights from the NSI evaluation. 
Shifting Strategy Amid Changing 
Opportunities
During its lifespan, NSI strategy shifted in 
response to changing opportunities in the global 
landscape while retaining many of its original 
targets. The foundation re-examined the NSI’s 
strategies and goals after an initial three-year 
investment and, after some tweaks, extended 
the initiative for another three years. A mid-
course evaluation of the initiative carried out 
by a respected expert in the field suggested that 
Hewlett’s investments in 
building the capacity of both 
government and civil-society 
actors to develop localized 
solutions to nuclear challenges, 
enhance oversight, and shape 
the debate at the domestic 
and international levels were 
viewed as critical to improving 
nuclear security globally. 
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the NSI’s strategies had been largely successful 
to date — namely due to the code of conduct 
and the grantee’s work on adoption of the New 
START — and that continuation of the NSI 
would likely achieve more of the initiative’s tar-
gets. Hewlett’s board agreed to extend the NSI, 
but as the second phase of the initiative began, 
a number of shifts occurred around the globe. 
Tensions between the U.S. and Russia intensi-
fied as Russia effectively annexed the Crimean 
Peninsula. At the same time, relations between 
the U.S. and China had begun to cool and the 
2011 earthquake and tsunami, which resulted in 
a critical incident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear 
plant, dampened the potential for expansion of 
nuclear energy. These factors, along with increas-
ing gridlock in Congress, meant that earlier 
hopes for rapid advances in nuclear security pol-
icies were starkly diminished. Internally, a new 
program officer assumed management of the 
NSI. With a strong background in policy work 
via years of experience working on Capitol Hill, 
this officer recognized that advancing policy- 
related targets would be challenging. 
As the second phase of the NSI moved forward, 
strategies shifted to reflect a “perceived niche” 
for the foundation (Redstone Strategy Group, 
2012). Goals continued to be ambitious, empha-
sizing alignment and agreements among global 
actors. The new program officer focused her 
efforts on building a stronger, campaign-style 
infrastructure across the field so that everyone 
— including a range of grantees and members 
of the Peace and Security Funders Group — 
would be more effective both individually and 
collectively. 
A Mismatched Focus on Policy Targets
Continued focus on ambitious policy targets was 
a mismatch with both the time frame of the NSI 
and the mix of funded strategies. The NSI’s mul-
tiple policy targets suggest that perhaps there 
were outsized expectations about what could be 
accomplished within given grant cycles and via 
the funded strategies. 
As noted, Hewlett’s philosophy of grantmaking 
at the outset of the NSI was guided by a strategic 
philanthropy approach that emphasized setting 
clear goals and measureable targets. The targets 
were useful in so far as they helped establish 
what the initiative set out to achieve. However, 
many of the NSI’s fixed targets became quickly 
outdated as global circumstances shifted and 
thus were less useful as longer-term benchmarks. 
Setting targets in the dynamic context of policy 
change work is challenging because impact is 
affected by a multitude of factors, including the 
evolving complexities of the decision-making 
environment as well as the types, scale, or com-
bination of funded strategies (Guthrie, Louie, 
David, & Foster, 2005; Reisman, Gienapp, & 
Stachowiak, 2007; Morariu & Brennan, 2009). 
The potential pitfall of relying on highly speci-
fied targets as the measure of success is that they 
may skew toward a best-case scenario — what 
could happen given unfettered strategy. Targets 
may not accurately reflect what is achievable 
given fundamental capacity in the field and 
inherent obstacles in the landscape, or the less 
dramatic but often very important incremental 
steps necessary to advance goals. 
While the NSI realized progress on many fronts 
— including the enhanced capacity of certain 
actors, stronger dialogue and debate, and adop-
tion of the New START and the code of conduct 
— it was probably overly optimistic to expect the 
initiative to advance so many ambitious targets 
without more sustained and targeted investment 
(Harvey, 2016). In addition, important successes 
of the initiative were not reflected within the 
100-plus targets — e.g., greater alignment and 
cohesiveness among grantees and funders in 
the field and increased momentum due to new 
energy and innovation in the field. 
As noted above, policy work is somewhat like 
an iceberg: it is not always easy to see in its 
entirety. Major policy advances are typically 
visible — like the tip of the iceberg — but reflect 
only one component of a much greater set of 
achievements, i.e., the deep, wide base of related 
results that are less visible. The base of the poli-
cy-change iceberg is comprised of elements that 
signal the right conditions for big policy “wins” 
as well as less newsworthy budgetary or tech-
nocratic steps that can still be quite valuable, so 
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it is important to bring them to light (Reisman, 
et al., 2007). As noted, there is evidence that the 
NSI influenced change “below the waterline” 
— e.g., greater capacity to build bridges, stron-
ger relationships with decision-makers, and 
enhanced coordination among a range of actors 
in the field. Although these outcomes were not 
identified as expected targets at the outset of the 
initiative, these types of changes were nonethe-
less a logical fit given the mix of NSI strategies. 
During the NSI’s second phase, as the landscape 
shifted, a greater focus on advancing the neces-
sary preconditions for policy change rather than 
precise policy targets would have been more 
reasonable and “right sized” given the initia-
tive’s breadth and time frame.
Challenges to Measurement
Because the NSI’s measurement tended to focus 
on achievement of targets and did not inten-
tionally assess progress on interim outcomes, 
measurement efforts were not as comprehensive 
or valuable as they could have been. As is com-
mon with a strategic philanthropic approach, 
measurable goals and targets were viewed as 
the markers of progress for the initiative. Many 
of the targets were built on linearly predictive 
“x will lead to y” assumptions. As policy targets 
appeared to be less obtainable later in the initia-
tive’s life cycle, the NSI program officer focused 
on advancing “below the waterline” outcomes. 
However, grantee reporting and the foundation’s 
measurement remained narrowly focused on tar-
gets. Grantee reporting focused on performance, 
such as the number of conferences organized, 
the satisfaction of conference participants, the 
production of conference proceedings, and num-
ber of white papers developed. The vast major-
ity of grantee reports stated that performance 
targets had been “met” or “exceeded.” However, 
there was no formal or intentional measurement 
of how grant-funded work was advancing policy 
targets or broader strategy outcomes. 
The increased infrastructure and development 
of champions realized by investing in a few 
“anchor” grantees, for example, was not identi-
fied as a key expectation or measure of the NSI’s 
progress. In reality, infrastructure development 
is largely accepted in the field of advocacy and 
policy-change evaluation as a key progress indi-
cator for advocacy investment.5 Similarly, the 
convening role that the foundation played led 
to stronger alliances among the PSFG. While 
increased capacity, the championing of develop-
ment, and alliance building are not adequately 
captured by quantitative targets, these changes 
can in fact be directly measured through many 
innovative techniques that are becoming com-
mon practice in the advocacy-evaluation field. 
Intentional measurement in these areas can 
help foundations to better estimate progress 
Because the NSI’s measurement 
tended to focus on achievement 
of targets and did not 
intentionally assess progress 
on interim outcomes, 
measurement efforts were not 
as comprehensive or valuable 
as they could have been. As 
is common with a strategic 
philanthropic approach, 
measurable goals and targets 
were viewed as the markers 
of progress for the initiative. 
Many of the targets were built 
on linearly predictive “x will 
lead to y” assumptions.
5A few existing frameworks describe outcome areas related to advocacy and policy-oriented work, and describe the areas of 
infrastructure and other interim outcomes that reflect enabling conditions or otherwise signal progress for long-term policy 
change or social change. See Reisman, et al., 2007; Coffman, 2007; Reisman,  Gienapp, & Kelly, 2015; Alliance for Justice, 2013; 
and Klugman, 2010. 
Gienapp, Reisman, Shorr, and Arbreton
The Foundation Review  //  2017  Vol 9:1    17
R
esults
and inform decisions about strategies or fund-
ing approaches. 
Approaches to Gauging Success
The NSI evaluation acknowledged the weak-
nesses inherent in a too-narrow assessment 
of policy work, and applied a broader frame 
to describe the initiative’s successes. Gauging 
success by documenting the percent of targets 
achieved over the course of the initiative would 
have provided a more quantified but a much 
more limited picture of the results of the ini-
tiative. While some targets were achieved, the 
changing global landscape meant that many 
targets were off the mark and out of reach. The 
assumptions upon which targets were built 
became overtaken by events — assuming, that is, 
that the original optimistic views of the opportu-
nity were solid in the first place. 
By probing deeply in the areas “below the water-
line,” the NSI summative evaluation was able 
to provide rich data about the varied types of 
success that were actually realized and pointed 
toward areas of opportunity to continue the 
work. Significantly, the evaluation was also able 
to lift up important messages about the exit 
strategy and the effects of the initiative sunset 
on partners who were continuing to forge ahead 
to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of 
bad actors. While the foundation’s intent was to 
make a gracious and conscientious exit and leave 
the field in a strong place, there were unique 
aspects to Hewlett’s role and the expectations 
applied to its presence and actions in the field 
that left questions about how key efforts would 
be sustained following the NSI’s sunset. 
Impact of Evaluation Findings on 
Hewlett’s Thinking 
Many of the NSI evaluation findings illuminate 
how careful thought about goals, outcomes, 
and strategy — at the heart of the foundation’s 
Outcome-Focused Philanthropy (OFP) approach 
— reflects both strengths and potential pitfalls 
(William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 2016). 
While the foundation’s approach to OFP has 
evolved, its commitment to reflect on both 
successes and failures has been consistent 
(Hartnell, 2003). When Hewlett staff commis-
sioned the NSI evaluation, a hope was to use the 
results for learning. Aside from documenting 
achievements of the NSI, the evaluation sur-
faced provocative issues and recommendations 
relevant to complex, policy-oriented, and time-
bound initiatives — features that characterize 
the foundation’s existing work. The NSI evalu-
ation findings brought timely value to Hewlett 
staff in a number of areas. 
Outcome-Focused Philanthropy
The evaluation affirmed a reorientation of out-
come-focused grantmaking already in progress at 
the foundation. Outcomes-Focused Philanthropy 
retains a focus on outcomes already in place at 
Hewlett, but more explicitly recognizes the need 
at times to flex and adapt outcomes throughout 
a philanthropic strategy’s life cycle. As described 
earlier, there was a too-strict management to 
the NSI’s highly aspirational goals and myriad 
specific targets and not enough attention to how 
developments in the field suggested the needs for 
course adjustments, such as closing opportunity 
windows. While management to goals contin-
ues, OFP places greater emphasis on the utility of 
interim outcomes, scanning for developments in 
the field and at the foundation, and learning and 
adaptation through every stage of a strategy’s life 
cycle — origination, implementation, refresh, 
and, in the case of some strategies and all time-
bound initiatives, exit. 
A subsequent evaluation of another Hewlett 
Foundation policy-oriented strategy provides 
an example of how the foundation flexed and 
adapted outcomes. Program officers intention-
ally shifted monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
questions to better recognize the initiative’s 
early stage. Given the context, foundation staff 
recognized that the greatest value of M&E 
would be to guide decision-making and future 
implementation of the strategy. The initial M&E 
questions focused heavily on the extent of prog-
ress toward policy goals. Upon reflection, those 
questions were recognized as too far-reaching 
and too summative, given the strategy’s stage of 
development. Foundation staff instead adopted 
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questions that explored grantees’ access to pol-
icymakers, grantee alignment with the estab-
lished policy goals, and the degree to which 
grantees might form an effective coalition. 
These questions were a better fit with the strat-
egy context and M&E purpose, and ultimately 
more useful as findings informed the strategy’s 
adaptation and ongoing implementation.  
Balancing Expectations
The evaluation underscored the need to balance 
expectations about the timeline for progress 
with an understanding of what information is 
needed to make good decisions at key strategic 
moments. As the NSI case illustrates, attack-
ing complex, wicked problems — which are 
the focus of many of the Hewlett Foundation’s 
programs and initiatives — is tricky, and prog-
ress is almost always nonlinear. It is also true 
that advancing ambitious goals often requires 
a long time horizon. To guide learning and 
decision-making in both long-term efforts and 
those known to be time bound, the foundation’s 
evaluation guidance — including its Evaluation 
Principles and Practices (William and Flora 
Hewlett Foundation, 2012) — encourages staff to 
establish comprehensive evaluation questions in 
a project’s origination phase, then prioritize and 
sequence, and apply evaluation findings to learn-
ing and adaptation throughout the life cycle. 
Evaluation questions may address the overall 
effectiveness of the work, value for money, or 
continued “fit” of the strategy and approach, 
particularly given any changes in the external 
environment. 
The NSI evaluation also confirmed the impor-
tance of assessing field capacity thoroughly 
before launching an ambitious initiative, as well 
as the need to align a strategy’s scope and goals 
with the capacity of the field to accomplish those 
goals. In the NSI example, the need for signifi-
cant capacity building was identified only after 
the foundation was deep into the work. Taking 
that to heart, Hewlett has included questions 
about capacity and needs in the OFP framework; 
these are to be addressed throughout the strat-
egy life cycle. 
Finally, the NSI findings illustrate the need for 
caution about targets. Targets can be useful to 
help gauge progress, particularly when initiatives 
are mature, when strategies are stable, when a 
robust evidence base has been established upon 
which to base expectations about future out-
comes, or when there is a clear and logical time 
frame for achievement. For initiatives such as 
the NSI that are implemented within a highly 
For initiatives such as the NSI 
that are implemented within a 
highly complex environment, 
continuing to hammer away 
at specific targets even when 
opportunities have changed 
suggests the need to establish 
better triggers during strategy 
origination that can spur 
reflection about whether or 
when it is necessary to change 
course. For example, staff 
may need to periodically ask 
and answer questions such 
as: What facilitates or creates 
barriers to progress? How will 
we assess whether to keep 
going or change directions? 
It is important to ask these 
questions early enough to make 
a difference, and to be open 
and transparent with grantees, 
engaging them with regard to 
these questions as appropriate. 
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complex environment,6 continuing to hammer 
away at specific targets even when opportuni-
ties have changed suggests the need to establish 
better triggers during strategy origination that 
can spur reflection about whether or when it is 
necessary to change course. For example, staff 
may need to periodically ask and answer ques-
tions such as: What facilitates or creates barri-
ers to progress? How will we assess whether to 
keep going or change directions? It is important 
to ask these questions early enough to make a 
difference, and to be open and transparent with 
grantees, engaging them with regard to these 
questions as appropriate. 
Methods Aligning With Principles
The NSI evaluation illustrated methods that 
aligned well with the Hewlett Foundation’s eval-
uation principles. The foundation’s first principle 
of evaluation is “lead with purpose.” The NSI 
evaluation offered a clear model of how to do 
so when engaged in complex work, be it policy 
change or other long-term endeavors. Given that 
the policy arena can be unpredictable, it is a mis-
take to focus only — or too much — on whether 
a particular policy change has happened. 
“Progress” — frequently the basis for decisions 
about whether to continue an investment — 
should encompass key intermediate steps that 
make ultimate change more likely, such as 
improvements in the capacities of advocates 
or the addition of new allies. The foundation 
increasingly recognizes the value of including 
such interim achievements as relevant markers 
of headway in policy-focused strategies. There 
is more emphasis on how Hewlett’s investments 
can help create conditions for positive change: 
“below the waterline” outcomes versus emphasis 
on specific tactics and whether they generate 
high-profile targets. And there continues to be 
recognition of evaluation data’s value for learn-
ing and enhancing the efforts of the foundation 
and its partners. This approach has been applied 
recently in two foundation initiatives.7 
Exit Planning
The NSI evaluation helped refine thinking about 
exit planning. The Hewlett Foundation is now 
even more cognizant about the need to be as 
crisp and clear as possible regarding the defini-
tion of an initiative and the expectation of exit. 
It is important to point out how initiatives fit 
into the foundation’s ecosystem. In most areas, 
Hewlett invests for the long haul (e.g., perform-
ing arts, Western conservation, reproductive 
health). Initiatives are launched when the foun-
dation sees the potential to have an impact in a 
specific area, and can learn and test whether and 
how its philanthropic dollars can be leveraged to 
make a difference. However, the default expecta-
tion is that an initiative is time bound.
Two issues arose regarding the decision to end 
the NSI and exit the field of nuclear security. 
First, although the NSI was intended as a time-
bound effort, the work gained momentum, open-
ing up the hope that the foundation’s investment 
might continue. There was ambiguity among 
Hewlett staff, grantees, and partner funders 
about when, exactly, the NSI would end. Once 
the decision was made to exit, it caught the field 
by surprise — there was no sense of a planned or 
intended end. 
The NSI’s finite time horizon was not commu-
nicated clearly at the outset, either internally or 
6For further discussion of sense-making in complex systems, see Snowden, 2010. The framework sorts issues facing leaders 
into five contexts defined by the nature of the relationship between cause and effect. Four of these — simple, complicated, 
complex, and chaotic — require leaders to diagnose situations and to act in contextually appropriate ways. The fifth — 
disorder — applies when it is unclear which of the other four contexts is predominant. 
7The Cyber Initiative commissioned its first evaluation in 2016, focusing on progress in building a network of experts. While 
it was one of five initiative outcomes, staff believed it should be evaluated first because findings provide an opportunity 
for learning. To that end, they have identified a number of questions to investigate: Have cyber experts in industry, 
government, academia, and other relevant sectors begun working together? If not, why not? If so, what are the key enablers? 
Are there particular forces that can promote or inhibit the emergence of a network? The Madison Initiative commissioned 
an external evaluation group to work closely with the staff team throughout the initial three-year grantmaking period. The 
evaluators played the role of “critical friend” and helped the team take a developmental approach by asking tough questions, 
uncovering assumptions, and collecting and interpreting data to aid the initiative’s development with ongoing feedback 
offered in real time.
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externally. Although justification for the decision 
to exit was laid out for stakeholders in 2013, the 
hope that had mounted for the NSI’s extension 
led to disappointment both inside and outside the 
foundation. External stakeholders perceived the 
decision as abrupt and opaque, and contrary to 
the openness, frankness, and spirit of collabora-
tion that program officers brought to the PSFG. 
As one funder said, “we had spent so much time 
collaborating and being as open as possible that 
it would have been useful for us to have been 
involved earlier on before the foundation’s deci-
sion to completely pull out was made.” 
For grantees, Hewlett’s decision to exit resulted 
in significant uncertainty, and organizations had 
to make hard choices about where to focus their 
energy. Organizations’ need to increase their 
fund-development efforts necessarily resulted in 
diminished program resources — and this at a 
time when there were significant demands and 
activity in the field during the lead-up to the U.S.-
Iran nuclear framework. In retrospect, it seems 
clear that the foundation could have done a bet-
ter job signaling its intentions and communicat-
ing the decision to exit. 
Once the decision was made, the foundation 
sought to exit the NSI as conscientiously as pos-
sible, augmenting staff and taking other steps 
to leave the field and grantees in a strong posi-
tion. Grantees were informed of the decision a 
full year prior to the NSI’s final grants. Many of 
these grants, supported in part by the founda-
tion’s Organizational Effectiveness grantmaking 
program, enabled grantees to hire consultants 
and address particular areas of organizational 
weakness. One such grant, for instance, went 
toward a communications consultant to work 
with a leading center of scholarship on nuclear 
security. Two grants supported organizations 
facing transitions of longtime leadership, and 
another supported an international network of 
next-generation security professionals to develop 
a case statement to bolster deeper engagement 
of their constituents. In addition to these tar-
geted capacity-building grants, some anchor 
grantees received general support at larger than 
normal levels so they would have running room 
to adapt. The foundation commissioned the 
ORS Impact evaluation in part to harvest lessons 
for the NSI grantees and other funders — con-
ducting the evaluation in an open manner and 
providing grantees and grantmakers with oppor-
tunity to provide input on evaluation questions 
and preview findings, digest, and comment.
The Hewlett Foundation also took steps to pre-
serve funding for nuclear security efforts by both 
encouraging peer funders to stay in the field and 
supporting the recruitment of new funders to the 
field. The foundation was particularly concerned 
about continuation of support for its field-build-
ing efforts in Brazil, Turkey, and Israel, and the 
foundation’s staff stressed the value of this work 
to peer donors. 
Drawing from these and other lessons, the foun-
dation has heightened intentionality regarding 
The NSI’s finite time horizon 
was not communicated 
clearly at the outset, either 
internally or externally. 
Although justification for 
the decision to exit was laid 
out for stakeholders in 2013, 
the hope that had mounted 
for the NSI’s extension led to 
disappointment both inside 
and outside the foundation. 
External stakeholders perceived 
the decision as abrupt and 
opaque, and contrary to the 
openness, frankness, and spirit 
of collaboration that program 
officers brought to the PSFG.
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good exit planning. Hewlett is specifically 
mindful of the need to begin planning for exit as 
early as possible, communicate early and fre-
quently with grantees and other stakeholders, 
and work collaboratively to ensure a smooth 
transition for all. There is also greater inten-
tionality with regard to drawing actionable 
lessons from a planned exit. The foundation’s 
OFP materials also encourage program staff to 
consider a range of questions as they gear up for 
and carry out an exit: 
• To what extent did the strategy achieve its 
goals, outcomes, and key implementation 
markers? 
• What were major accomplishments? 
• What were significant factors enabling or 
inhibiting success? 
• What lessons were learned? 
• What would you have done differently? 
• What are recommendations for colleagues, 
other foundations, and the field? 
Conclusion 
The NSI leaves behind a proud legacy: a 
strengthened professional community, signifi-
cant policy accomplishments, noted progress in 
priority strategy areas such as nuclear energy 
and emerging powers, and the infusion of new 
energy and innovation into the nuclear policy 
field. These outcomes were beneficial to the 
field, though they weren’t initially identified as 
the focus of the initiative. 
Evaluation highlighted the importance and 
value of thoughtfully identifying outcomes 
for a time-limited investment — particularly 
an investment that aims for ambitious policy 
results. In addition, the evaluation points to the 
utility of regularly reassessing the relevance of 
established outcomes (or targets) given likely 
shifts in the operating environment, and appli-
cation of broader measurement frames that gen-
erate learning and inform action. The Hewlett 
Foundation has applied lessons and insights 
from the NSI summative evaluation in order 
to enhance and strengthen efforts regarding 
implementation and measurement of complex 
work, including exit planning for time-limited 
initiatives. While not broadly generalizable, we 
believe that the NSI evaluation findings never-
theless offer lessons that are widely applicable 
in the field as investment in time-bound special 
initiatives has become a more common philan-
thropic approach.
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